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ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN FINANCIAL (TAX) AND NON-
FINANCIAL CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTING 
By Ilias Bantekas* and Alexander Ezenagu** 
ABSTRACT 
We test the assumption as to whether financial and non-
financial reporting by multinational corporations (MNCs) voluntarily 
adhering to human rights standards are subject to ethical guidelines. 
In particular, the paper finds that neither the operators of human rights 
impact assessments (HRIAs) nor audited companies, at least in any 
manner that is publicly detectable, impose any ethical conduct on 
human rights auditors. Neither individual auditors nor human rights 
audit firms have set up independent regulatory bodies that would 
regulate auditors and audit firms. This has a detrimental effect on 
HRIAs and the process itself. The same assumption is tested against 
financial corporate reporting, specifically tax. It is found that 
corporations voluntarily subjecting themselves to HRIAs do not infuse 
human rights-based reporting standards into their tax audits and 
neither do tax professionals. No ethical duty is prescribed by tax 
auditor professional bodies or companies themselves. For the latter, 
this is incongruous given that ethical tax reporting is no less a human 
rights issue than any other human rights impact arising from the 
operations of a corporation in the host state. The absence of ethical 
audit standards in financial and non-financial human rights-related 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Corporate due diligence, chiefly in respect of human rights 
and environmental risks, is now a common feature of the operating 
cycle of large corporations. Developed states are increasingly starting 
to require human rights impact assessments from their 
multinationals,1 particularly in respect to operations abroad. Impact 
statements are also common in the work of international financial 
 
1 See particularly UK Modern Slavery Act 2015. See ‘Guidance for Reporting 
Entities’, available at: https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/criminal-justice/files/modern-
slavery-reporting-entities.pdf; Australia Modern Slavery Act 2018; Loi no. 2017-399 
du 27 Mars 2017 relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et des entreprises 
donneuses d’ordre, available at: https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cid
Texte=JORFTEXT000034290626&categorieLien=id. For a useful English summary, 
see European Coalition for Corporate Justice (ECCJ). See Business and Human Rights 
Resource Centre (BHRRC) “France’s Law on the Corporate Duty of Vigilance: A 
Practical and Multidimensional Analysis in English” at https://www.business-
humanrights.org/en/frances-law-on-the-corporate-duty-of-vigilance-a-practical-and-
multidimensional-analysis-in-english. 
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institutions (IFIs),2 the United Nations (UN) bodies3 and the European 
Union (EU),4 among others. Besides the aforementioned public 
institutions, the majority of such assessments are the result of industry-
wide self-regulation. HRIAs required by law or the inter-
governmental organizations discussed above do not demand a 
particular format; at best, they set out some baseline requirements (e.g. 
that in respect of indigenous persons their free, prior, and informed 
consent be taken into consideration), and take it for granted that the 
results are not fabricated. Where an HRIA is not demanded by a public 
entity under law or contract, it is voluntary and the same is true of the 
contents and format of such assessments. The majority of audits are 
performed largely by for-profit commercial entities that have 
established themselves as key actors in human rights and 
environmental audits, including Global Reporting Initiative5 and 
KPMG Banarra,6 among others. These audit firms have set up their 
 
2 UN Doc E/C.12/2016/1 (22 July 2016) ¶¶ 4,11. See for example recent reports, UN 
Doc A/HRC/31/60/Add.2 (12 January 2016),  ¶¶ 81(a), 83(b). The World Bank Group 
has set up quasi-judicial mechanisms, such as the Bank’s Inspection Panel and the 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) Ombudsman, which are 
competent to hear complaints concerning violations of the Bank’s internal rules, not 
violations of human rights law, albeit as these arise from violations of assessments 
incumbent on corporate borrowers. For an overview of the mandate and cases of the 
Inspection Panel, see http:// ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/Pages/Home.aspx. 
3 See Guiding Principles on Human Rights Impact Assessment for Trade and 
Investment Agreements, UN Doc A/HRC/19/59/Add.5 (19 December 2011); Guiding 
Principles on extreme poverty and human rights, UN Doc A/HRC/21/39 (18 July 
2012); CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 24’ (10 August 2017) ¶¶ 17, 21-22; CRC 
Committee, ‘General Comment 19’ UN Doc CRC/CG/19 (10 July 2016), ¶ 47. 
4 ‘EU Commission Working Paper Operational Guidance on taking account of 
fundamental rights in Commission impact assessments’, SEC (2011) 567 Final (6 May 
2011). The CJEU has, in fact, emphasized the importance of such HRIAs in the 
adoption of primary and secondary EU legislation. See Schecke and Eifert v Land 
Hessen, Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09, ECLI:EU:C:2010:662. HRIAs are also required 
through two EU instruments, namely: The Directive on Public Procurement and the 
Directive on Non-Financial Information Disclosure. Under the latter, companies with 
over 500 employees are required to disclose information on policies, risks and results 
as regards their respect for human rights. 
5 See GRI, Sustainability Disclosure Database, https://database.globalreporting.org 
(last visited Feb. 9, 2021). 
6 Human Rights & Social Impact-Banarra, KPMG, https://home.kpmg/au/en/home/
services/advisory/risk-consulting/climate-change-sustainability-services/human-
rights-social-impact.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2021). 
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own standardized formats and procedures for undertaking HRIAs, 
although they do not necessarily see this process as a box-ticking 
exercise, and hence each audit may contain different types of 
information.7 Internationally recognized frameworks for sustainability 
reporting include: the GRI Sustainability Reporting Standards, the 
OECD Guidelines, the UNGC’s Communication on Progress,8 the 
International Organization for Standardization (‘ISO’) 26000,9 and the 
UN Guiding Principles Reporting Framework.10 As companies vary in 
their size, operations and managerial control, among others, so do 
their human rights risks and the range of persons and entities affected. 
Several important ethical considerations arise from the 
compilation and assessment of corporate human rights risks by 
external auditors.11 Chief among these is respect for participants, 
informed consent, specific permission required for audio or video 
recording, voluntary participation, participants right to withdraw, full 
disclosure of funding sources, no harm to participants, avoidance of 
undue intrusion, deception techniques, issues with anonymity, 
participants’ right to check and modify a transcript, confidentiality in 
respect to personal matters, data protection, enabling participation, 
ethical governance, provision of grievance procedures, 
appropriateness of research methodology, full reporting of methods, 
conflicts of interest, moral hazard, and duty of care. Another that is 
largely ignored is that auditors either do not have, do not request, or 
do not understand the relevance of data and information that is not 
directly relevant to human rights risks. A typical example is corporate 
forum shopping by multinational corporations (MNCs) for countries 
 
7 Human rights audits are undertaken also by auditors in an individual capacity. 
Although the discussion on ethics is pertinent to them, in all other respects this paper 
deals exclusively with auditing firms. 
8 Participation, United Nations Global Compact, https://www.unglobalcompact.org/
participation/report (last visited Jan. 29, 2021). 
9 ISO 26000 Social Responsibility, ISO, https://www.iso.org/iso-26000-social-
responsibility.html(last visited Jan. 29, 2021). 
10 UN Guiding Reporting Principles, https://www.ungpreporting.org (last visited Jan. 
29, 2021). 
11 This article will only focus on the ethical duties of external, as opposed to internal, 
auditors. Internal auditors will be subject to the ethical by-laws, or codes of conduct 
of their corporation, as these are further regulated by the laws of the country of 
incorporation or effective seat. 
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with lax tax rules and detection systems,12 or countries whose conflict 
of laws rules make it impossible for grievance tort claims to be litigated 
abroad.13 None of these are prima facie human rights concerns, and it 
would be hard even for most lawyers to identify their linkages with 
human rights.14 Yet, such forum shopping may be designed or 
destined to deny future victims of corporate human rights abuses of 
their right to effective access to justice, as well as fundamental socio-
economic rights as a result of poor tax collection.15 These observations 
obviously raise the question as to who is best suited to carry out 
HRIAs, in terms, at least, of the expertise required of auditors to carry 
out their task in a way that takes into account a holistic account of 
human rights risks in a manner that is independent from the audit firm 
and the appointing corporation. 
The role of lawyers is critical in this regard, but they are not 
the key protagonists in the relevant industry.16 This observation is 
 
12 Such a choice may be predicated, among others, on cost considerations (e.g. low or 
no pension contributions; light environmental compliance; light health and safety 
requirements), tax avoidance, or avoidance of public scrutiny by civil society 
organizations, especially in autocratic states. See Press Release, Conference on Trade 
and Development, Increasingly Complex Ownership Structures of Multinational 
Enterprises Poses New Challenges for Investment Policymakers, U.N. Press Release 
UNCTAD/PRESS/PR/2016/016 (Jun. 21, 2016). 
13 Legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the 
activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises, art. 4(5), art. 
6(4) (Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group (OEIGWG), Revised Draft, Jul. 
16, 2019). See also Ilias Bantekas, The Linkages between Business and Human Rights 
and their Underlying Causes, 43 HRQ 118 (2021). 
14 Human rights linkages to trade, investment, sovereign debt, privacy and other areas 
of commercial regulation or self-regulation have only been studied thoroughly in the 
last two decades and are generally the domain of specialists. See Sovereign Debt And 
Human Rights 169-185 (Ilias Bantekas & Cephas Lumina eds., 2018). 
15 In 2019, GRI adopted, following public consultation, the GRI 207/Tax 2019 
Standard, with a view to promoting tax transparency in financial audits. Like all other 
standards mentioned in this article, this too is of a voluntary nature. GRI 207: Tax 
2019 Fact Sheet, Global Reporting Initiative, https://www.globalreporting.org/
media/sfcpcrt4/gri-207-tax-standard-2019-factsheet.pdf?id=1616 (last visited Feb. 1, 
2021). See also Ilias Bantekas, The Human Rights and Development Dimension of 
Foreign Investment Laws: From Investment Laws with Human Rights to 
Development-Oriented Investment Laws, 31 FLA. J. INT’L. L. 339 (2020). 
16 There are no professional standards requirements for becoming a human rights 
auditor. The HRIA industry providers simply require qualifications relevant to the task 
undertaken and GRI views auditors as being self-regulated. 
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even more compelling from the fact that human rights have been 
viewed by several liberal Western states as a “tool” of non-state 
(usually alleged terrorist) actors to gain benefits and avoid justice.17 
However, as will be demonstrated in the case study on the Chad-
Cameroon pipeline, HRIAs require expertise that is broader from 
human rights law, such as anthropology, sociology, and others and 
hence human rights auditing is not and should not be the exclusive 
domain of lawyers or legal experts. 
If one looks at the major international due diligence/HRIAs 
initiatives, there is generally no reference to any ethical guidance or 
code by which to compile and assess human rights risks, whether from 
the perspective of the auditing firm or the appointed auditors. There 
is a clear conflation of ethics — probably best to call it a confusion 
because of the lack of ethical rules — with the compilation process and 
contents of human rights audits. A good example is offered by the 2018 
OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business.18 Although 
there is some overlap between ethics and ethical audit compilation, 
there are also notable differences. The most notable is the absence of 
auditor duties and responsibility. Such an outcome would be 
unthinkable for lawyers and in fact there is even a growing body of 
professional rules regulating lawyering before transnational and 
international courts, despite the fact that: A) the statutes of these courts 
 
17 In Holder et al. v. Humanitarian Law Project et al. 561 US 1, the plaintiffs had 
sought to provide human rights training, advocacy and peacemaking to the Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey and the LTTE in Sri Lanka, both of which had 
already been designated terrorist organisations in the USA. Under a federal US statute, 
it was a crime to ‘knowingly provide material support or resources to a foreign terrorist 
organisation’. The term ‘material support’ meant, among other things, ‘training, expert 
advice or assistance’. The US government construed the statute as prohibiting all types 
of training to designated terrorist organisations, including human rights training that 
is meant to promote non-violence within these organisations, the submission of an 
amicus brief in their favour by a lawyer, as well as helping a proscribed organisation 
to petition international bodies to end violent conflicts. The Supreme Court declared 
that the provision of intangibles such as human rights training allowed a proscribed 
organisation to free resources for other illegal purposes (fungibility), which it was in 
the interests of the executive to curtail. As a result, the prohibition of free speech was 
justified under the circumstances. 
18 OECD Due Diligence guidance for Responsible Business Conduct, OECD, 
https://mneguidelines.oecd.org/OECD-Due-Diligence-Guidance-for-Responsible-
Business-Conduct.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2021). 
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did not originally envisage such ethical regulation;19 and B) these rules 
are not grounded in any particular legal order. The hypothesis in this 
article is that there are at least three reasons for this glaring omission 
of human rights auditor-specific ethical rules. The first has to do with 
the fact that human rights due diligence, with the few exceptions 
mentioned above, is voluntary. It is perhaps the case, therefore, that it 
would dissuade companies from partaking in this voluntary process if 
audits were ‘burdened’ with ethical rules. The second concerns cost 
and professionalization of the HRIA business itself. The ethical 
regulation of the process requires a regulated professional body, with 
entry requirements similar to those demanded of lawyers and certified 
accountants. Such requirements would be accompanied by higher fees, 
which many companies find far too excessive for what is already a 
costly voluntary exercise. Anything beyond ethical considerations 
regarding the content of an HRIA would entail professionally 
regulated duties for auditors themselves, which creates a paradox; 
namely a voluntary process, in which the process drivers are subject to 
binding regulation. The third reason concerns the freedom of auditors 
to reach subjective outcomes. While some human rights risks are clear 
and objective (e.g. demolition of houses and forced relocation), others 
are not (e.g. impact of tax avoidance on future socio-economic rights). 
It is not in the interest of human rights auditors to go out of their way 
and set out ethical guidelines that would objectify outcomes.20 Where 
an audit is predicated on a contractual relationship and which is in the 
interest of the audit firm to be long-term, the objectivity of the audit is 
questionable, where the auditors are not independent from the audit 
firm. Put another way, it would be unthinkable for the state to employ 
all available lawyers yet ask them to represent accused persons fairly 
without confidentiality, professional privileges, or acting in their best 
interest. It would equally be unthinkable to allow an inter-
 
19 See International Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants (including 
International Independence Standards), Int’l Ethics Standard Bd. for Acct., 7-27 (Apr. 
2018). 
20 This issue is even more pressing given the discussions in the UN concerning a 
business and human rights treaty. Human rights audits play a crucial role in this draft 
treaty, but the ethical regulation of the industry is not discussed at all. See Ilias 
Bantekas, The Emerging UN Business and Human Rights Treaty and its Codification 
of International Norms, GEO. MAS. INT’L. L. J. forthcoming (2021). 
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governmental trustee to use funds provided by states at the sole 
discretion of the trustee and in violation of international law.21 
The question of tenuous linkages is especially true since the 
concept of a human rights audit is broader than an HRIA. While an 
HRIA is quite focused on human rights risks, not all such risks are 
encompassed within the confines of an HRIA. As already stated, 
human rights auditors may simply not possess the expertise to 
ascertain the linkages between a corporation’s long-term tax or conflict 
of laws planning, which may ultimately produce acute human rights 
impacts. Hence, if a company claims adherence to human rights 
standards, such as the OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises, 
its human rights audit should go beyond an HRIA, but should extend 
to all its other audits, particularly its financial audits. From an ethical 
perspective, this means that financial auditors would be subject to the 
ethical rules of their professional body for failure to identify human 
rights risks.22 Besides criminal conduct, such as money laundering or 
fraud,23 accountants’ ethics rules are silent on a duty to assess human 
rights risks in the process of a financial audit. The same is true 
regarding lawyers’ professional duties.24 As a result, despite the 
likelihood of human rights risks ascertainable in financial audits, the 
auditors’ ethical obligations do not extend over these. This is a 
significant gap that can only be remedied either by a radical 
amendment of the pertinent ethical rules, or through unilateral 
undertakings by a corporation’s directors concerning the extension of 
human rights assessments to financial and other audits. Both 
suggestions are clearly difficult to materialize and are against the 
 
21 See Ilias Bantekas, ‘Effective Management of International Aid through Inter-
governmental Trust Funds’ (2021) 18 Loy U Chi Int’l L Rev forthcoming; Ilias 
Bantekas, The Emergence of the Intergovernmental Trust in International Law, (2011) 
81 BYIL 224, 231; Ilias Bantekas, ‘The Legal Personality of World Bank Funds under 
International Law’, (2020) 56 Tulsa Law Review 101-143 
22 Int’l Ethics Standard Bd, supra note 19. 
23 Id. 
24 Lawyers as gatekeepers are already burdened with a significant amount of duties, in 
addition to their ethical obligations. There are no additional human rights duties on 
the legal profession, other than compliance with human rights law as this applies to 
legal professionals. Some feeble attempts have been made to show the role of lawyers 
in the implementation of the UNGPs. See IBA Draft Guidance for Legal Professionals 
on the Meaning and Implementation of the Guiding Principles (2014). 
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interests of directors and pertinent professional bodies (lawyers and 
accountants). 
This article is organized into two main parts, each involving a 
theoretical analysis, followed by a long case study. The first discusses 
how the content requirements of HRIAs are conflated with the ethical 
requirements of the assessment itself. This, narrow and inadequate 
species of HRIA ethics is quite different from the extensive body of 
legal ethics that regulates legal professionals.25 To illustrate the case, 
we provide a case study of a World Bank-related impact assessment, 
which gives rise to legal and non-legal ethical issues and which is 
meant to demonstrate that the absence of concrete human rights-
centered ethical guidelines in HRIAs can, even with the best of 
intentions, lead to outcomes that effectively violate fundamental 
rights. The second part examines the role of human rights-based ethics 
in the financial reporting obligations of multinational corporations. If 
such corporations consent to be subjected to voluntary HRIAs, then 
they should have no objection infusing the same human rights 
standards in the assessment of their taxes and finances. In this 
connection, we examine the ethical regulation of tax professionals, and 
whether their professional duties provide space for making human 
rights-based tax assessments. Our findings are supported by a case 
study involving MNCs in the mining sector. 
2. AUDITOR ETHICS IN HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACT ASSESSMENTS 
Despite the variety of framework instruments employed to 
carry out HRIAs, they are all predicated around some common, 
inescapable features.26 These include: A) Materiality and salience, which 
concerns the human rights risks that are more critical to the operations 
and business relationships of the assessed corporation. No doubt, such 
a definition of materiality is not only subjective, but it tells us nothing 
about who decides27 what is material to a corporation, why, and most 
importantly, critical to whom? The general industry understanding is 
 
25 See J Herring, Legal Ethics (OUP 2016). 
26 See C Ferraciolli, J Parkhomenko, ‘Addressing Human Rights Impact in 
Sustainability Reporting’, in I Bantekas, MA Stein (eds), Cambridge Companion to 
Business and Human Rights (Cambridge UP 2021) forthcoming. 
27 Oddly enough, this is to be decided by the reporting organisation. See GRI 101: 
Foundation, principle 1.1. 
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that as far as the last question is concerned (to whom) this 
encompasses primary stakeholders (materiality) and those groups or 
persons most likely to be worst impacted (salience).28 B) Boundary, 
which examines where human rights risks occur, or are likely to occur. 
This may require, and usually does, a holistic examination of the entire 
supply chain. C) Impacts, on particular individuals, communities, the 
economy, the environment, sustainable development, and others. 
The survey of HRIA-related instruments examined by the 
authors reveal that only rarely do these instruments set out traces of 
what might resemble ethical considerations on the part of the 
assessors; and even then, they are not framed as ethical duties but 
merely as pre-requisites for a solid, fair assessment. This is true, for 
example, with respect to GRI Standards, such as ‘GRI 412: Human 
Rights Assessment’. The onus there is on the reporting organization to 
provide as much relevant information as possible to the auditors. This 
focus on auditors making use of all available information (scoping) 
and asking the right questions is evident in all assessment 
frameworks.29 However, such quality controls hardly confer any 
ethical duties on individual auditors or auditor organizations as they 
assume that auditors are independent, skilled, and follow particular 
terms of reference (ToR), that are guaranteed to produce ethical 
outcomes. Exceptionally, the Danish Institute for Human Rights’ 
Guidance points to some ethical considerations, although it does not 
frame them as such, in the form of the following questions (to 
auditors): 
- Is detailed information provided regarding the skills and 
experience of the HRIA team, i.e. including human rights and other 
necessary expertise, language skills, local knowledge, etc.? — Are 
provisions made for the involvement of translators and local 
interlocutors as necessary?30 
 
28 Corporate Reporting Dialogue, Statement of Common Principles of Materiality of 
the Corporate Reporting Dialogue (2016) https://corporatereportingdialogue.com/
wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Statement-of-Common-Principles-of-Materiality.pdf. 
29 See Danish Institute for Human Rights (DIHR), ‘Scoping Practitioner Supplement: 
Human Rights Impact Assessment Guidance and Toolbox’, at 4-5 (2016), 
https://www.humanrights.dk/business/tools/human-rights-impact-assessment-
guidance-toolbox/phase-1-planning-scoping (Scroll down and click to download the 
file). 
30 DIHR, Human Rights Impact Assessment Guidance and Toolbox: Terms of 
Reference, Practitioner Supplement, at 4 (2016), https://www.humanrights.dk/sites/
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Regarding the auditing team’s particular expertise, it poses the 
following question: 
- Is detailed information provided regarding the skills and 
experience of the HRIA team, i.e. including human rights and other 
necessary expertise, language skills, local knowledge, etc.?31 
With respect to governance and reporting, the Guidance 
requires that the auditing team enjoys independence and that a plan is 
laid out in advance so that stakeholders can be meaningfully engaged. 
- Is the governance structure for the HRIA clearly outlined, i.e. 
the role and independence of the HRIA team, the role of the company 
contact(s) and counter-part(s) (both at headquarters and subsidiary-
level), the role of any advisory panel or peer review mechanism etc.? 
- Are the requirements for reporting clearly stipulated, 
including publication of the HRIA report, but also other modes of 
reporting back to rights-holders and other stakeholders regarding the 
impact assessment findings (e.g. community meeting involving those 
who participated as well as the impact assessment team and company 
to share and discuss findings and mitigation measures to be 
implemented; reporting back to rights-holders through the company 
community liaison officers etc.)?32 
It is clear that all the HRIA Standards purposely conflate due 
diligence requirements expected of audits and auditors with ethics. 
This is, however, achieved at the expense of any ethical duties of 
auditors towards the stakeholders for whom the audit is performed, 
nor indeed in observance of an ethical code of conduct. That the audit 
should comply with some requirements that, if applied to individuals, 
would have resembled ethical duties is irrelevant because the non-
observance of such requirements does not necessarily invalidate the 
HRIA and at best may constitute a breach of contract by the auditing 
firm against the reporting organization. Ethical duties may well be 
imposed or assumed unilaterally even in the absence of a 
regulatory/professional body, whether unilaterally, by contract or by 




31 Id.; see also OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct 
(2018), particularly Q26 at 67, which addresses the qualities of auditors on the basis 
of qualifications and skills, without mentioning any ethical duties. 
32 Id. 
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including civil society organizations (CSOs) would be able to point out 
violations of ethical rules with a view to demonstrating whether the 
outcomes of a particular HRIA have been tarnished by bias or other 
unethical conduct, or whether they are contrary to the fundamental 
teachings of a relevant discipline. 
Non-lawyers working on or interested in HRIAs may find the 
discussion on ethical regulation of little practical significance perhaps 
even a luxury. To understand why this is not so, it is perhaps 
instructive to briefly examine the key justifications for the regulation 
of lawyers, namely: the cynical, the client protection, and the public 
interest perspectives. In one of the major reviews of the legal profession 
in England and Wales in 2004, Sir David Clementi identified the roles 
justifying regulation of the legal profession, namely: access to justice, 
maintenance of the rule of law, protection of consumer interests, 
promotion of healthy competition among well trained lawyers, and 
promotion of a public understanding of citizen’s rights.33 Readers will 
not fail to realize that some of these objectives are central to HRIAs, 
particularly rule of law, consumer (as well as investor) interests, and 
enhanced stakeholder participation. It is, therefore, important that 
auditors be subject to some degree of regulation. Unlike lawyers 
whose direct duties are owed to their clients, however, human rights 
auditors’ duties have never seriously been defined. While it is true that 
they owe client-like duties to the corporations that have contracted 
their services, the function of said services are not to simply act in the 
best interests of their client, but to assist the client in conforming with 
its human rights commitments. This is different to the nature of duties 
owed by lawyers. Even so, given the wider public interest function of 
HRIAs, just like the legal profession, human rights auditors can only 
serve said public interest if subject to some regulation, not least 
because of the benefits of regulated professions34 as articulated in the 
beginning of this paragraph by reference to the legal profession.  
 
33 See D Clementi, Review of the Regulatory Framework for Legal Services in England 
and Wales: Final Report, at 15-17 (2004), http://www.avocatsparis.org/Presence_
Internationale/Droit_homme/PDF/Rapport_Clementi.pdf. 
34 See Austin Sarat, The Profession versus the Public Interest: Reflections on Two 
Reifications, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 1491 (2002); see also Institute of Chartered Accountants 
for England and Wales (ICAEW), Acting in the Public Interest: A Framework for 
Analysis (2012) (provides helpful insights while being skeptical that it may be used as 
a smokescreen for advocating in one’s self-interest). 
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There are several models of regulation for the professions and 
it is assumed in this article that human rights auditing is indeed a 
profession.35 These models consist of: rules-based, enforced by a 
regulatory body; outcomes-based, which relies significantly on personal 
discretion to achieve fair outcomes (premised on consequentialism 
and rule-consequentialism); self-enforcement, where the profession 
develops ethical rules and procedures that must meet the approval of 
a regulator; and competitive regulation, which is grounded on enhanced 
regulation following consultation with the profession.36 Although it is 
not suggested here that human rights auditors undergo the extensive 
regulation of the legal profession,37 or that in the absence of 
transnational regulation states should regulate territorially,38 the 
industry itself should move towards the adoption of common ethical 
rules and self-regulation that encompasses all stakeholders in one way 
or another. 
Self-regulation is fundamental to the organization of industries 
across borders, such as the banking, construction, and other sectors, 
although none set out ethical criteria for work undertaken, nor do they 
serve as regulatory bodies.39 The key reason is that they are not meant 
to regulate a profession or the conduct of professionals. It is assumed 
that professionals, e.g. lawyers and accountants, will be subject to the 
ethical rules of the territorial state. It is uncommon for a professional 
activity to not be subject to ethical regulation in any jurisdiction and 
yet, like in the present instance, to raise so many ethical issues. While 
industry-based self-regulation offers no paradigms of professional 
regulation, international entities, particularly courts and tribunals, 
have discovered that although their drafters made no reference to the 
ethical regulation of legal professionals (counsel, judges, prosecutors), 
 
35 See Andrew Abbott, The System of Professions (1998); see also European Union 
Directive 2005/36/EC on Recognition of Professional Qualifications (defines liberal 
professions as “those practiced on the basis of relevant professional qualifications in 
a personal, responsible and professionally independent capacity by those providing 
intellectual and conceptual services in the interest of the client and the public”). 
36 Herring, supra note 25, at 76. 
37 Id. at 77-9. 
38 This would turn out to be disastrous, as it would allow for forum shopping in the 
less regulated jurisdictions. 
39 This is different to the ethical regulation of the industries and their employees under 
domestic laws, e.g. UK Chartered Bankers Institute. See F Bell, Culture, Conduct and 
Ethics in Banking: Principles and Practice (Kogan Page 2018). 
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it was important that such regulation be provided through broad 
consultation with direct participants.40 The same is also true of 
international commercial arbitration, where several empirical studies 
have shown a consistency among counsel as to the acute ethical issues, 
such as delay and guerrilla tactics.41 Arbitration resembles human 
rights auditing because persons appearing as counsel on behalf of 
parties need not be lawyers and are not regulated by the bar 
(professional legal association) of the seat of arbitration. Unlike ethical 
codes for arbitrators there is no equivalent for counsel, even though 
the IBA adopted in 2011 a set of Principles on Conduct for the Legal 
Profession. However, these Principles apply to all types of legal 
proceedings and has not yet received universal approval.42 Some 
arbitral institutions have drafted relevant guidelines, such as the 
London Court of International Arbitration’s (LCIA) General 
Guidelines for the Parties’ Legal Representatives which are binding on 
the parties – and by implication their legal representatives – because 
they are an integral part of their arbitration rules which are binding on 
the parties, but not their legal representatives. The parties are obliged 
to ensure that their representatives have agreed to comply as a 
condition of representation.43 Although in practice tribunals are 
reluctant to remove counsel for improper behavior, they possess an 
inherent right to both rebuke and remove in situations where they 
threaten the integrity and operation of proceedings.44 Advanced 
jurisdictions, such as New York, have begun a trend whereby counsel 
 
40 Int’l Ethics Standard Bd., supra note 19, at 7-27. 
41 Edna Sussman & Solomon Ebere, All’s Fair in Love and War, 22 AM. REV. INT’L 
ARB. 611, 614-15 (2011) (discussing a survey of international arbitration counsel here 
a significant number of respondents reported experiencing unfair guerilla tactics in 
arbitration proceedings). Ethical gaps are evident in processes driven by states or 
powerful non-state actors, such as the World Bank, against weak, fragile or distressed 
states. See Ilias Bantekas, R Vivien, ‘The Odiousness of Greek Debt in Light of the 
Findings of the Greek Debt Truth Committee’ (2016) 22 European Law Journal 539; 
Ilias Bantekas, ‘A Human Rights-Based Arbitral Tribunal for Sovereign Debt’, (2018) 
29 American Review of International Arbitration 52. 
42 See Catherine A. Rogers, Ethics in International Arbitration (Oxford Univ. Press 
2014). 
43 The London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA), Arbitration Rules Art. 18.5 
(3d ed. 2020), www.lcia.org/Dispute_Resolution_Services/lcia-arbitration-rules-
2020.aspx#Article%2018. 
44 See Id. at art. 18.6. 
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is sanctioned for frivolous applications to set aside awards.45 It is 
beyond the scope of this narrow article to analyze the precise contours 
of a possible regulatory framework for human rights auditors. 
The pitfalls in the absence of ethical rules and professional 
responsibility for auditors undertaking HRIAs will become evident in 
the following section on the work of the World Bank. Some scholars 
have gone as far as arguing that HRIAs constitute a 
‘governmentalization’ of human rights, where ‘the individual 
diminishes as a source of concern and certainly as an active agent and 
is replaced by a primary focus among the powerful on monitoring, 
measuring, and manipulating the population for benign ends.’46 
3. ETHICS IN WORLD BANK POLICIES ON INDIGENOUS PERSONS 
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD) is a member of the World Bank Group (Group). The IBRD does 
not undertake broad HRIAs, albeit it requires that borrowers execute 
relevant operational policies (OP) in the implementation of the funded 
project. In the execution of some policies, e.g. with regards to 
indigenous people or relocation, social and environmental impact 
assessments are necessary. Only content-related guidance is offered 
for these by the IBRD’s OP, as well as perhaps some foundational 
principles, and hence the borrower is free to establish terms of 
reference with an ethical dimension. Since 1991, the World Bank has 
required borrowers to mitigate any adverse effects from the financed 
project on indigenous populations.47 To this end it has devised a 
layered process that is designed not only to protect indigenous peoples 
but also to enhance their developmental advancement. This is 
important because, in theory, the Bank is in an ideal position to 
implement indigenous rights since both the investor and the local 
government are dependent upon its approval of the loan. The Bank’s 
OP 4.10 on indigenous peoples requires the borrower to engage in a 
 
45 DigiTelCom, Ltd v Tele2 Sverige AB, 12 Civ 3082 (S.D. N.Y., 2012). 
46 D McGrogan, The Population and the Individual: The Human Rights Audit as the 
Governmentalization of Global Human Rights Governance, 16 Int’l Con Law 1703 
(2019). 
47 See Ilias Bantekas, Sociological Concerns Arising from World Bank Projects and 
their Impact on Sub-Saharan Indigenous Peoples, 1 INT’L J. OF L IN CONTEXT 143, 
145-50 (2005). 
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process of ‘free, prior, and informed consultation’, also known as FPIC 
(which is now part of customary international law) with the affected 
indigenous group. FPIC must yield ‘broad community support’ for the 
project in order for it to be financed.48 This is subject to a five-prong 
process, which consists of the following: 
1. Screening by the Bank to identify whether indigenous 
peoples are present in, or have collective attachment to, the project 
area;49 
2. A social assessment by the borrower;50 
3. A process of free, prior, and informed consultation 
with the affected indigenous peoples’ communities at each stage of the 
project, and particularly during project preparation, to fully identify 
their views and ascertain their broad community support for the 
project;51 
4. The preparation of an indigenous peoples’ plan (IPP) 
or an indigenous peoples’ planning framework (IPPF);52 and 
5. Disclosure of the draft IPP or draft IPPF.53 
In the screening process the Bank, or the borrower, seeks to 
determine the existence of indigenous people in the project area and 
their attachment to it. To this end, it consults qualified social scientists, 
particularly anthropologists with expertise in the project area. In 
addition, the Bank also consults the indigenous group and the 
borrower.54 Where the Bank determines the existence of indigenous 
peoples, it is then incumbent on the borrower to undertake a social 
assessment study to evaluate the project’s effects. Where potentially 
negative effects are detected the social impact assessment (SIA) must 
propose alternative measures. The SIA, which is a much narrower 
HRIA, may determine the impact on variables, such as community 
structures and institutions, changes in social behavior, local norms, 
customs and activities, changes in social control mechanisms, creation 
 
48 Para. 1, Operational Policy (OP) 4.10 (as revised in April 2013). 
49 Id. at ¶¶ 6, 8. 
50 Id. at ¶¶ 6, 9. 
51 Id. at ¶¶ 6, 10–11. 
52 Id. at ¶¶ 6, 12–13. 
53 Id. at ¶¶ 6, 15. 
54 This is chiefly in order to localize indigenous rights, rather than offer general 
solutions, which may be alien or impractical. See Eleni Polymenopoulou, Localizing 
Intellectual Property and UNESCO Claims, 6 CAN. J. OF HUM. RTS. 87 (2017). 
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of employment opportunities, and others. It is not untypical of 
borrowers in general – and governments for that matter – to 
manipulate the SIA as a political rather than as a planning tool. This 
may be done in order to justify a particular policy, rather than as a tool 
to mitigate the effects of the policy on the affected population. The 
Bank’s only guarantee against manipulation is the consensus of the 
affected people, which itself is subject to manipulation, as will be 
demonstrated in the following section. Further, the borrower may well 
demonstrate an increase in income in respect to the group’s 
households, which he may then interpret as a determinant in the rise 
of livelihood. In many cases, this increase is artificial since it is the 
result of lump sum compensations paid to affected persons whose 
effects are of a limited duration.55 Following the drafting of the 
social assessment plan, the borrower must next engage in direct 
consultation with the indigenous peoples on the basis of three 
principles: (1) an appropriate gender and inter-generationally 
inclusive framework encompassing broad civil society representation; 
(2) employment of appropriate consultation methods to the cultural 
and social values of the affected people, with special attention to the 
concerns of women, youth, and children, and their access to 
development opportunities; and (3) providing full access and 
disclosure to the relevant reports and information.56 Before the Bank 
can go ahead and approve the loan, the borrower must demonstrate 
that the project has received broad community support on the basis of 
the FPIC.57 It is natural, however, at this stage for the affected group 
 
55 As a result, Ashley and Hussein emphasize that poverty reduction is not necessarily 
reflected in a sudden increase of income, but should be approached from a study of 
food security, vulnerability, social inferiority, access to productive means and an 
understanding of the objectives of each household (i.e. in the sense of what is 
important to them – education for their children, land security, etc. C. Ashley and K. 
Hussein, Developing Methodologies for Livelihood Impact Assessment: Experience of 
the African Wildlife Foundation in East Africa (Overseas Development Institute 
Working Paper 129, 2000), 14. 
56 OP 4.10, supra note 48, at ¶ 10. 
57 This is not a mere condition imposed by the Bank. Rather, it has been endorsed as 
a customary principle by human rights treaty bodies in relation to the taking of 
indigenous lands, whatever their form of land tenure. See Poma Poma v. Peru, 
(HRCtee) (2009), ¶ 7.6; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR), Concluding Observations on Colombia, UN Doc. E/C.12/Add.1/74 (30 
November 2001), ¶ 33; Dann, Mary and Carrie, (IACHR) (2002), ¶ 131. 
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and civil society organizations to barter with the borrower for further 
concessions, knowing full well that their agreement is necessary for the 
continuation of the project. This is certainly welcome, because it 
ensures that indigenous concerns are voiced and heard throughout the 
process and that indigenous social and cultural demands are met, even 
if the local government is opposed to them. Any special agreement 
must be communicated by the borrower to the Bank.58 
On the basis of the social assessment and in consultation with 
the affected communities, the borrower prepares an IPP that sets out 
appropriate measures ensuring that the affected group will receive 
culturally appropriate social and economic benefits and that any 
adverse effects are avoided, mitigated, or compensated.59 The role of 
civil society in the consultation process is critical, because indigenous 
peoples’ access to information and their level of education may lend 
itself to manipulation by the borrower. By way of illustration, in the 
absence of civil society the borrower may paint an idyllic picture of the 
project without emphasizing any of its social and environmental evils. 
Equally, the borrower may attempt to negotiate only with persons of 
influence and thus ignore the community’s broader aspirations. 
It has not always been abundantly clear in the Bank’s policies 
on indigenous peoples whether its focus should be directed at 
preserving the group’s cultural and social status quo, or whether it 
should also be open to the possibility that the group may wish to 
radically alter this traditional status. Paragraph 7 of Operational 
Directive 4.20 of 1991, which has now been replaced by OP 4.10, raised 
this issue as a dilemma for Bank management as follows: 
How to approach indigenous peoples affected by development 
projects is a controversial issue. Debate is often phrased as a choice 
between two opposed positions. One pole is to insulate indigenous 
populations whose cultural and economic practices make it difficult 
for them to deal with powerful outside groups. The advantages of this 
approach are the special protections that are provided and the 
preservation of cultural distinctiveness; the costs are the benefits 
forgone from development programmes. The other pole argues that 
indigenous people must be acculturated to dominant society values 
and economic activities so that they can participate in national 
 
58 OP 4.10, supra note 48, at ¶ 11(e). 
59 Id. at ¶ 1. 
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development. Here the benefits can include improved social and 
economic opportunities, but the cost is often the gradual loss of 
cultural differences. 
Paragraph 1 of OP 4.10 addresses this issue by requiring that 
all Bank-financed projects impart culturally appropriate social and 
economic benefits. The Policy goes even further by stressing that the 
Bank may, at a country’s request, support development policies that 
help to strengthen local laws in favour of indigenous groups, set up 
poverty-reduction programmes and projects owned by indigenous 
peoples, as well as address gender and intergenerational issues,60 
among others. 
The ethical implications up to this point of the exercise are 
immense since there is no guarantee that the borrower’s auditors are 
independent, free of any conflicts, possess sufficient expertise, or are 
subject to any control regarding the best possible culturally sensitive 
suggestion.61 Unlike HRIAs, a SIA of this nature determines the 
livelihood of an indigenous group, including policy questions on 
relocation and displacement. Even so, the Bank provides no ethical 
guidance to the borrower and its auditors. One is at pains to find any 
ethical regulation of external auditors whatsoever. The Bank’s Ethics 
and Conduct Business Department62 is only concerned with intra-bank 
ethical conduct (i.e., of its employees)63 and does not attempt to 
address any of the ethical issues identified above. 
In practice, this process is expensive and cumbersome for 
borrowers and to a certain degree intrusive for the target states. 
Moreover, vulnerable and marginalized indigenous groups are 
typically exploited for their labor and lands by local elites, including 
timber and natural resources corporations, non-indigenous farmers, 
and corrupt local government officials. Thus, there are many actors 
who are averse, if not outright hostile, to the enhancement of the status 
 
60 WORLD BANK GROUP, THE WORLD BANK OPERATIONAL MANUAL, 
Operational Directive 4.20: Indigenous Peoples (1991), at http://wbln0018.
worldbank.org/Institutional/Manuals/OpManual.nsf/0/0F7D6F3F04DD703 
98525672C007D08ED?OpenDocument. 
61 See David Calvey, The Art and Politics of Covert Research: Doing ‘Situated Ethics’ 
in the Field, (Sociology, 2008). 
62 Ethics and Business Conduct Department, The World Bank, https://www.
worldbank.org/en/about/unit/ethics_and_business_conduct (last updated Nov. 20, 
2020). 
63 Id. 
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of indigenous peoples, in terms of legal, social, and financial status. 
Hence, the Bank should not simply strive to accept an IPP because it 
has received broad consensus from the indigenous group in the project 
area. Rather, it must make every effort to eliminate any possible 
hostility against the group following the completion of the project and 
avoid the temptation of temporary financial benefits. 
In the late 1990s, the Group proceeded to provide US $115 
million towards financing the Chad–Cameroon pipeline project, which 
was meant to transport Chadian oil to the Cameroonian coast. The 
construction of the Cameroon portion of the pipeline was to traverse 
the country’s Atlantic forest zone, part of which is inhabited by the 
Baka/Bakola indigenous peoples. These groups are also known as 
pygmies, but the term carries a pejorative connotation, and the Bakola 
themselves do not accept it, despite the fact that it appears heavily in 
the literature.64 They maintain a traditional lifestyle that is distinct not 
only from that of the general population of Cameroon, but also from 
neighboring tribal and semi-tribal peoples.65 Unlike other groups they 
are principally engaged in hunting, trapping, and fishing, and only 
recently began to cultivate as an alternative;66 yet, farming is only of 
secondary financial importance to them not only because of their 
cultural identity, but also because they are not land owners.67 
The traversal of the pipeline through traditional Baka/Bakola 
lands gave rise to two interrelated issues. The first concerned the social 
impact of the project on this community, whereas the second involved 
the potential realignment of inter-ethnic relations with neighboring 
groups and the state itself. The IPP foresaw that the project would 
bring progress to the area and proposed both individual and collective 
 
64 See CS Abega, Pygmées Baka, Le Droit à la Différence (Presses de l’Université 
Catholique d’Afrique Centrale 1998). 
65 See Ngambouk Vitalis Pemounta, Forest Conservation, Wildlife Preservation and 
the Baka Pygmies of Southeast Cameroon, 84 GeoJournal 1035 (2019). 
66 See Koji Hayashi, Hunting Activities in Forest Camps Among The Baka Hunter-
Gatherers of Southeastern Cameroon, African Study Monographs, 29(2): 73-92 (Jul. 
2008). 
67 Such a lifestyle has given rise to a distinct scholarly literature that seeks to determine 
the conservationist role of indigenous communities. See Janis B. Alcorn, Indigenous 
Peoples and Conservation, Vol. 7 No. 2 Conservation Biology (Jun. 1993); Serge 
Bahuchet, Spatial Mobility and Access to the Resources Among the African Pygmies, 
in Mobility and Territoriality: Social and Spatial Boundaries Among Foragers, 
Fishers, Pastoralists and Peripatetics, Berg. Publ., (Mar.7, 2008). 
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compensation which consisted of the construction of huts and the 
provision of tools and compensation for destroyed crops and 
farmland. There was also provision of a limited supply of electricity, 
access to health care, and education. 
The project was bound to disrupt the Baka/Bakola traditional 
lifestyle, given that the pipeline was destined to pass through 
forestland used for their principal activities of hunting and crop 
gathering. Such an eventuality would necessarily have entailed 
relocation within a more confined forest space or adjustment to 
agriculture as the Baka/Bakola exclusive livelihood. Both alternatives 
involved some social adaptation whose consequences the borrowers 
and the Bank failed to address. The most serious problem was that of 
land ownership. Under Cameroonian law, customary title to land has 
been available since 1974 as long as the land is occupied or exploited.68 
Land is deemed occupied where the user has constructed buildings 
and dwellings, whereas exploitation is demonstrated in cases of 
farming and grazing. The guiding principle for customary title to be 
granted is therefore a ‘man’s clear control of the land and evident 
development.’69 Given the Bakola’s hunting and crop gathering 
livelihood, they can never expect to possess any customary law rights 
under the existing law. They fare no better in Cameroon’s forests. The 
law there distinguishes between non-permanent forest domains, 
which may be converted for agricultural use, and permanent forest 
domains that are reserved for conservation.70 Forest laws have 
imposed severe restrictions on Bakola hunting and crop gathering 
rights because forest products are limited only to personal use. 
Moreover, because the Bakola do not technically ‘occupy’ or ‘exploit’ 
converted forestland they have never been able to claim any pertinent 
rights. This has driven the Baka/Bakola to poverty because they 
traditionally barter with wild game and forest crops, which is their 
primary source of income. Moreover, it has forced them to become 
 
68 See Samuel Nguiffo, Pierre Ètienne Kenfack, and Nadinee Mballa, L’incidence des 
lois foncières historiques et modernes sur les droits fonciers des communautés locales 
et autochtones du Cameroun. Forest Peoples Programme (2009). Available at: 
www.forestpeoples.org/sites/fpp/files/publication/2010/05/cameroonlandrightsstudy
09fr.pdf. 
69 Cameroon, Ord. No. 74–1, art. 15(1) (July 6, 1974) (laying out the land tenure 
system). 
70 Nguiffo, supra note 68, at 13-17. 
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subservient to other groups which have acquired land ownership. 
Equally, although Cameroonian law envisages annual proceeds from 
a logging tax that are to be distributed to local village communities, in 
practice the Baka/Bakola are excluded by rival groups because they 
are not recognized as having resident status.71 
As a result of the legal impediments restricting their primary 
(hunting and crop-gathering) and secondary (agriculture and farming) 
financial activities, the Bakola have become subservient to neighboring 
groups, namely certain Bantu tribes.72 This situation has been 
exacerbated by the fact that the Bantu are farmers, and therefore have 
come to own land. This stark inequality between the two groups has 
not been addressed by Cameroon, despite the obvious vulnerability of 
the Bakola and has led many of them to be considered Bantu serfs. This 
inequality has curtailed the Bakola’s access to markets to sell or barter 
their forest products, which has in turn forced them to barter with the 
Bantu who naturally exploit them. Neither the borrowers nor the Bank 
thought it wise to alter their subservient and serf (economic and social) 
status, despite the fact that they desired to escape this cycle of 
exploitation through the acquisition of land, educating their children 
and improving their standard of living, while retaining much of their 
traditional lifestyle. Without delaying the project the Bank should, in 
similar circumstances, oblige the host state to accept legislative 
changes alleviating the subservient condition of vulnerable people. In 
the instant case, this could have been achieved by granting the Bakola 
land rights and rendering them recipients of the logging tax. 
3.1 ETHICAL ISSUES NOT CONSIDERED BY THE WORLD BANK 
This SIA clearly necessitated expertise in both land law 
(customary and other), as well as anthropology of the Baka/Bakola. 
Paragraph 8 of OP 4.20 simply requires the ‘technical judgment of 
qualified social scientists with expertise on the social and cultural 
 
71 Centre for Environment and Development (CED) Réseau Recherches Actions 
Concertées Pygmées (RACOPY), The Situation of Indigenous Peoples in Cameroon: 
A Supplementary Report Submitted to CERD, Doc. CERD/C/CMR/19 21, (27 January 
2010). 
72 See G. Ngima Mawoung, The Relationship between the Bakola and the Bantu 
Peoples of the Coastal Regions of Cameroon and their Perception of Commercial 
Forest Exploitation, 26 African Study Monographs, 209 (2001). 
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groups in the project area.’ While the presence of customary law 
experts was crucial, they were viewed as irrelevant.73 That 
anthropologists are called upon to provide judgment on ‘poverty 
reduction,’ ‘sustainable development,’ ‘human rights,’ and ‘social and 
economic benefits that are culturally appropriate and gender and 
inter-generationally inclusive,’74 is absurd. This is not only far beyond 
their expertise, but calls into question judgments of a personal nature 
that are not subject to further control.75 It is not even clear how 
anthropologists can evaluate and ensure FPIC under the particular 
circumstances of their mandate. The SIA did not, to the best of our 
knowledge, specify if the auditors were compelled to follow a 
particular set of ethical guidelines. In fact, this is something the World 
Bank itself could require in its operational policies with borrowers. 
In the case at hand, there are numerous codes of conduct, 
including those adopted in 2012 by the American Anthropological 
Association (AAA),76 as well as the 2009 International Association of 
Impact Assessment.77 The literature has identified several ethical 
issues in SIAs, and by extension HRIAs,78 conducted by 
anthropologists and social scientists, namely: 
respect for participants, informed consent, specific permission 
required for audio or video recording, voluntary participation, 
participant right to withdraw, full disclosure of funding sources, no 
 
73 This is inexcusable, given that culture has become an inextricable aspect of 
international law and hence cannot be excluded from SIAs or other assessments 
involving people. See Eleni Polymenopoulou, Cultural Rights in the Case Law of the 
International Court of Justice, 27 LEIDEN J. INT’L. L. 447 (2014). 
74 OP 4.20, supra note 60, ¶1. 
75 Dr. Robert Fisher, Anthropologists and Social Impact Assessment: Negotiating the 
Ethical Minefield, The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology, 231 (29 Aug. 2008); 
Richard Howitt, The importance of process in social impact assessment: Ethics, 
methods and process for cross-cultural engagement, Ethics Place and Environment, 
209 (10 Oct. 2010). 
76 AAA, The AAA Principles of Professional Responsibility and the AAA Handbook 
on Ethical Issues in Anthropology, Nov. 1 2012, http://ethics.americananthro.org/
category/statement/. 
77 Vision, Mission, Values, Professional Code of Conduct, and Ethical 
Responsibilities, January 2009, https://www.iaia.org/pdf/Code-of-Ethics.pdf. 
78 There is even a peer-reviewed journal dedicated to the study of impact assessments, 
namely Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal. IAIA’S Quarterly Journal, 
IMPACT ASSESSMENT AND PROJECT APPRAISAL, https://www.iaia.org/iapa-
journal.php. 
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harm to participants, avoidance of undue intrusion, no use of 
deception, the presumption and preservation of anonymity, 
participant right to check and modify a transcript, confidentiality of 
personal matters, data protection, enabling participation, ethical 
governance, provision of grievance procedures, appropriateness of 
research methodology, full reporting of methods … conflict of interest, 
moral hazard and duty of care.79 
4. THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF HUMAN RIGHTS ETHICS 
IN TAX REPORTING 
In our analysis of HRIAs, it became evident that while human 
rights auditors apply standardized formats to the audits, there is no 
use of ethical codes or guidelines and, because this is an unregulated 
profession, there exists no professional body to monitor the ethical 
conduct of the auditors. This is detrimental to the legitimacy of human 
rights auditing. This second part of the paper seeks to ascertain to what 
degree ethics play a part in financial reporting, with a focus on tax 
reporting. Tax reporting is different in at least two ways with regards 
to human rights reporting/auditing. Firstly, tax professionals, chiefly 
certified accountants and lawyers, are subject to ethical rules as part of 
their profession, whether nationally or internationally.80 Secondly, tax 
reporting is not voluntary, but part of a mandatory process for all 
corporate entities. What is unique about the linkage between corporate 
tax reporting and human rights is that the same corporations that 
subject themselves to voluntary HRIAs should, in theory, accept the 
same human rights standards in their tax reporting as they do in their 
 
79 Franck Vanclay, James T. Baines & C. Nicholas Taylor, Principles for Ethical 
Research Involving Humans: Ethical Professional Practice in Impact Assessment Part 
1, 31 Impact Assessment & Project Appraisal 243 (2013), https://www.
tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14615517.2013.850307?needAccess=true. 
80 For instance, the American Institute of CPAs (AICPA) subjects its members to 
standards contained in the AICPA Code of Professional Conduct. See AICPA Online 
Professional Library, Code of Professional Conduct https://pub.aicpa.org/
codeofconduct/Ethics.aspx (last visited Jan. 28, 2021); see also, AICPA, Statements 
on Standards for Tax Services 1-7, https://www.aicpa.org/content/dam/aicpa/
interestareas/tax/resources/standardsethics/statementsonstandardsfortaxservices/dow
nloadabledocuments/ssts-effective-january-1-2010.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2021). 
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non-financial reporting.81 After all, if a corporation agrees to become 
human rights compliant, surely this encompasses all its operations, 
including its tax conduct.82 
If this is the case, then corporations should accept or infuse 
HRIA standards in their tax reporting. However, to the best 
knowledge of the authors, there is no ‘standard’ in the sense described 
in the first part of this paper, whether designed by a human rights 
auditor or other that is currently available for use by MNCs and other 
corporations. Were such a ‘standard’ to be adopted by an auditor, such 
as KPMG or GRI, it might have the undesired effect of MNCs choosing 
not to undergo any further voluntary human rights reporting, for fear 
of double and unethical standards applied to their reporting. Ethics 
plays, or should play, a significant part in tax reporting, far more than 
in human rights reporting. Tax auditors/professionals, in balancing 
their duty of care to their clients and states, generally strive to report 
by reference to what is legal under the laws of the territorial state. As 
is shown elsewhere, legality in this sense is tantamount to taking 
advantage of means and processes in the law to achieve the greatest 
degree of tax avoidance. However, if a corporation prides itself in 
being human rights compliant, tax legality hardly suffices. Tax 
practices such as the “permissible” erosion of tax bases and shifting of 
profits to other jurisdictions through creative tax planning and 
reporting,83 while generally legal under particular circumstances, lack 
ethical value where they strip a poor, developing, nation and its people 
 
81 See Grace Zhao, How Tax Abuse and Human Rights are more Closely Related Than 
You Think, Global Financial Integrity (Jun. 30, 2014), https://gfintegrity.org/tax-
abuse-human-rights-related/; Lloyd Lipsett, Tax Abuse as a Business and Human 
Rights Issue, Shift (Oct. 2013), https://www.shiftproject.org/resources/viewpoints/
tax-abuse-business-human-rights/. 
82 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Gianluca Mazzoni, Taxation and Human Rights: A 
Delicate Balance, U. of Michigan Public Law Research Paper, No. 520 (2019); See 
also Sebastien Lopez Nieto, Taxation as a Human Rights Issue, International Bar 
Association Human Rights Law Committee Publications (2019); See also Kalmen 
Datt, Tax and Human Rights - Much Ado About Nothing, eJournal of Tax R. (2018); 
See Rachel Noble, Taxing Human Rights? Inst. Hum. Rts. and Bus. (May 1, 
2013), https://www.ihrb.org/focus-areas/finance/commentary-taxing-human-rights. 
83 See International Collaboration To End Tax Avoidance, Org. for Econ. Co-
operation and Dev., https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps; Richard Collier & Joseph L. 
Andrus, Transfer Pricing and the Arm’s Length Principle After BEPS (Oxford UP 
2017). 
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from much-needed tax revenues. Such practices are clearly antithetical 
to the values espoused by the same corporation in its non-financial 
reporting, wherein it may proclaim its adherence to human rights and 
the SDGs, among others. 
It is, therefore, imperative that non-financial and financial 
reporting be subject to similar, if not identical, human rights standards, 
even if through distinct reporting processes. Several benchmarks and 
pre-requisites must first be put in place. In the absence of formal state 
laws, corporations must unilaterally infuse ethical human rights-
related standards when they order their tax affairs. This must be 
expressly recorded in their internal instruments and by-laws and 
pertinent instructions be provided to their tax consultants and 
auditors. Ideally, tax professionals must, through their regulatory 
bodies, assume an ethical duty to report beyond the principle of 
legality, but in such a manner that a corporate tax audit is human 
rights and SDG-compliant. Both authors agree that we are far from 
such an eventuality, as it is fiercely resisted by tax professionals, their 
regulatory bodies, and corporations. In all likelihood it would also be 
resisted by industrialized states because a significant amount of 
revenues that would otherwise be repatriated (and re-invested in the 
home state) would necessarily remain in developing host states. It is 
clear, therefore, that in order for ethical tax reporting to occur it 
behooves MNCs, whether individually or collectively, to adopt ethical 
standards in their tax reporting and instruct their tax consultants to 
adhere to these standards. 
5.  ETHICAL ISSUES IN TAX PLANNING AND REPORTING 
Increasingly, the role of taxes in achieving the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) has been recognized in recent literature.84 
Some SDGs are intrinsically tied to the enjoyment and exercise of 
human rights bestowed on persons both by international law and 
applicable national laws. This linkage between taxation and the SDGs 
has seen long-needed global attention on the international tax system 
and the activities of tax practitioners. Tax justice advocates have, for 
 
84 Alexander Ezenagu, New Thinking on SDGs and International Law – Unitary 
Taxation of Multinationals: Implications for Sustainable Development, Ctr. for Int’l 
Governance Innovation (Nov. 2019), https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/
documents/SDG%20PB%20no.4_0.pdf. 
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years, beamed the light on the activities of multinational enterprises to 
take advantage of gaps in tax treaties and national laws to erode tax 
bases and shift profits to low-tax jurisdictions or countries with 
preferential tax regimes. The professionals behind these schemes have 
also come under scrutiny and reprobation. The Paradise Papers 
chronicle the activities of MNEs and tax practitioners who scheme to 
take advantage of tax systems, and their global network.85 
However, a debate which has been around for decades is 
which activities of MNEs and tax practitioners are condemnable, and 
which are permissible, even if not necessarily praised. This debate has 
often led to the division of these scheming activities into tax avoidance 
and tax evasion. The definition and treatment of tax evasion would 
appear straightforward. Tax evasion is understood by all as the willful, 
illegal activities of persons to not pay taxes or dues or to pay a lower 
sum.86 Tax evasion denotes fraudulent declarations or intentional acts 
of non-declaration of tax returns by persons that owe taxes in a 
jurisdiction.87 Tax avoidance presents a more difficult situation.88 
Agreeing on the scope of tax avoidance presents great conflict 
for all stakeholders, whether holding the position of a tax authority, 
tax practitioner, tax justice advocate, or by-stander. Steenkamp 
characterizes tax avoidance “by open and full disclosure, where a 
taxpayer has arranged affairs in a perfectly legal manner so that he has 
either reduced his income or has no income on which tax is payable.”89 
 
85 See Paradise Papers: Secrets of the Global Elite, Int’l Consortium of Investigative 
Journalists (ICIJ), https://www.icij.org/investigations/paradise-papers/. Notable 
publications include: Will Fitzgibbon, Tax Haven Mauritius’ Rise Comes at the Rest 
of Africa’s Expense, ICIJ (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.icij.org/investigations/paradise-
papers/tax-haven-mauritius-africa/; Will Fitzgibbon, Africa’s Satellite Avoided 
Millions Using a Very African Tax Scheme, ICIJ (Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.icij.org/
investigations/paradise-papers/africas-satellite-avoided-millions-using-african-tax-
scheme/. 
86 See José L. Escario Díaz-Berrio, The Fight Against Tax Havens and Tax Evasion: 
Progress Since the London G20 Summit and the Challenges Ahead, Observatorio De 
Politica Exterior Espanola (2011), https://www.fundacionalternativas.org/public/
storage/opex_documentos_archivos/e6bf4cecc9006abb8c528869ce93e9e2.pdf. 
87 Zoe Prebble & John Prebble, The Morality of Tax Avoidance, 43 Creighton L. Rev. 
693, 702 (2010). 
88 See id., at 703. 
89 Lee-Ann Steenkamp, Combating Impermissible Tax Avoidance throuh Efficient 
Administrative Approaches: What SARS can Learn from its Canadian Counterpart, 
45 Comp. & Int’l L.J. of S. Afr. 227, 227 (2012). 
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Diaz-Berrio, offering a more expansive definition, defines tax 
avoidance as, “although legal, involves the abusive exploitation of 
loopholes in national and international laws that allows multinational 
corporations ((MNCs) to shift profits from country to country, often to 
or through tax havens with the intention of reducing the amount of 
taxes they pay.”90 Oguttu sees tax avoidance by MNEs, as the use of 
gaps in the “interaction between different tax systems to reduce 
taxable income artificially or shift profits to low-tax jurisdictions in 
which little or no economic activity is performed.”91 She views it as the 
use of legal methods to arrange one’s affairs in order to pay less tax. 
This, according to Oguttu, is achieved by “using loopholes in tax laws 
and exploiting them within legal parameters.”92 
Given the overwhelming support for tax avoidance by tax 
practitioners, one is forced to question where the support for tax 
avoidance emanated from? As far back as 1935 in the case of Inland 
Revenue Commissioners (“IRC”) v. Duke of Westminster (“The Duke of 
Westminster Doctrine”),93 Lord Tomlin had held, to wit: 
Every man is entitled, if he can, to order his affairs so as that 
the tax attaching under the appropriate acts is less than it otherwise 
would be. If he succeeds in ordering them so as to secure this result, 
then, however unappreciative the Commissioners of Inland Revenue 
or his fellow taxpayers may be of his ingenuity, he cannot be 
compelled to pay an increased tax. 
This judgment in Duke of Westminster re-echoed an earlier 
decision in Partington v. Attorney-General where Lord Cairns ruled: 
As I understand the principle of all fiscal legislation, it is this: 
If the person sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law he 
must be taxed, however great the hardship may appear to the judicial 
mind to be. On the other hand, if the Crown, seeking to recover the tax, 
cannot bring the subject within the matter of the law, the subject is free, 
however apparently within the spirit of the law the case might 
otherwise appear to be.94 
 
90 Díaz-Berrio, supra note 86, at 16. 
91 Annet Wanyana Oguttu, Tax base erosion and profit shifting in Africa – part 1: 
what should Africa’s response be to the OECD BEPS Action Plan?, (2015) 48 Comp. 
& Int’l L. J. of S. Afr. 516, 516-17 (2015). 
92 Id. at 517. 
93 Inland Revenue Commissioners (“IRC”) v Duke of Westminster [1935] All ER 259. 
94 Lord Cairns in Partington v. Attorney General [1869], HL 100 at 122. 
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These decisions lend support to persons and tax practitioners 
to creatively order their affairs to pay minimum tax. Though, it would 
appear that these decisions in the Duke of Westminster’s case and the 
Partington’s case have been departed from by subsequent decisions of 
courts, even though they remain the biggest support for taxable 
persons and tax practitioners. In England, in the case of W.T. Ramsay 
Ltd. v. IRC,95 clearly departing from the Duke of Westminster doctrine, 
the House of Lords decided that 
. . . while the techniques of tax avoidance progress and are 
technically improved, the courts are not obliged to stand still.” The 
court held that to “force the courts to adopt, in relation to closely 
integrated situations, a step by step, dissecting approach which the 
parties themselves may have negated, would be a denial rather than 
an affirmation of the true judicial process. . .. 
This approach by the English court was recently followed in 
the Tanzanian case of African Barrick Gold Plc96 by Tanzanian Tax 
Revenue Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal). 
For tax practitioners and taxable persons, complying with and 
implementing tax laws present ethical dilemma. Particularly, for tax 
practitioners, balancing the duty owed to the client and the duty owed 
to the society walls one into a difficult space. For taxable persons, the 
enjoyment of one’s private property—a tenet of one’s fundamental 
human rights—persuades one to order one’s affairs to pay as little or 
no tax, as legally permissible. 
This section discusses the ethical issues in tax planning and tax 
reporting by tax practitioners. It focuses on tax practitioners who 
represent corporate entities. 
5.1. Tax Practitioners 
The network of tax practitioners includes tax accountants and 
lawyers, bankers, auditors, and regulators, who interact with taxation 
at different levels. Hereunder, we consider the ethical dilemma of tax 
lawyers and accountants who advise clients on ordering their tax 
affairs and, in many instances, implement the advice on behalf of the 
clients. To help discuss the ethical dilemmas tax lawyers and 
 
95 WT Ramsay Ltd. v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1981] All ER 865. 
96 African Barrick Gold Plc v Commissioner General, Tanzania Revenue Authority 
[2013] TZCA 1754 (CA). 
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accountants deal with, we introduce a case study as anecdotal 
evidence of the outcome of tax advisory. 
5.1.1. African Barrick Gold Plc v Commissioner General, 
Tanzania Revenue Authority97 
In African Barrick Gold Plc. v. Commissioner General, Tanzania 
Revenue Authority,98 the Tribunal held that African Barrick Gold Plc. 
(ABG) failed to withhold taxes from payment of dividends to its 
offshore shareholders and engaged in tax evasion.99 ABG is a United 
Kingdom-incorporated company, whose majority shareholder is 
Barrick Gold Corporation100, a Canadian company registered on the 
Toronto Stock Exchange.101 ABG has subsidiaries in Tanzania and 
elsewhere. However, as reported by the judgment, only its Tanzanian 
subsidiaries were actively engaged in business at the time.102 In 2012, 
the Tanzanian Revenue Authority opened an inquiry into the tax 
position of ABG, determined that it was resident in Tanzania for tax 
purposes, and concluded that it was required to withhold tax on 
dividends paid to its shareholders. The revenue authority’s position 
was that since only the Tanzanian subsidiaries were engaged in 
business, ABG’s dividend distribution must have come from the 
profits of these Tanzanian subsidiaries. The Tanzanian subsidiaries 
had all declared losses for the same period (years 2010, 2011, 2012, and 
2013) in which ABG distributed the dividends in question. 
ABG, in its defense, stated that the dividends paid to its 
shareholders for the period were paid from “distributable reserves 
 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 1. Acacia Mining Plc, Annual Report & Accounts 2017 9 (2018), 
http://www.acaciamining.com/~/media/Files/A/Acacia/Reports/2018/2017-acacia-
annual-report-accounts.pdf. (African Barrick Gold Plc is now known as Acacia 
Mining Plc, after changing its name in 2014 from African Barrick Gold Plc.). 
99 This is one case where the tribunal used tax evasion and avoidance, interchangeably. 
For the distinction between tax evasion and avoidance, see Allison Christians, 
Avoidance, Evasion, and Taxpayer Morality 44 WASH. U.J.L. & POL’Y 39 (2014). 
100 African Barrick Gold, supra note 96 (Barrick Gold Corporation holds 63.9% of the 
shares of Acacia Mining Plc.). 
101 See BARRICK GOLD CORP., FIRST QUARTER REPORT 71 (2018), https://barrick.
q4cdn.com/788666289/files/quarterly-report/2018/Barrick-2018-Q1-Report.pdf. 
102 African Barrack Gold, supra note 96, at 1. 
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created after reduction of the appellant’s capital and IPO proceeds”103 
and not from the undeclared profits of its three subsidiaries in 
Tanzania. On the issue of tax residence, ABG argued that it was not tax 
resident in Tanzania, since to be tax resident in Tanzania, a company 
had to be incorporated or formed under the laws of Tanzania.104 ABG 
argued that the words “incorporated” and “formed” meant the same 
thing and as such, a company had to be incorporated in Tanzania to be 
tax resident.105 Relying on the Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary 
(8th edition) and the Black’s Law Dictionary (9th edition), ABG called 
for the literal interpretation of the words “incorporated” and 
“formed”106 to give both the same meaning. 
The Tribunal rejected both claims by ABG. On the issue of tax 
residence, the Tribunal, adopting a purposive approach rule in 
construction of statutes,107 held that the word, “formed” must be 
construed to include the registration of the company under the Act. 
The Tribunal further held that, given that ABG had obtained a 
Certificate of Compliance, pursuant to section 453 of the Companies 
Act of Tanzania, ABG was duly formed in Tanzania as a foreign 
company, and as such was tax resident. 
On the issue of payment of dividends, the Tribunal held that it 
was inconceivable that ABG could pay out significant dividends to its 
shareholders over four consecutive years when its only assets 
consisted of the three loss-making entities incorporated in Tanzania, 
which had themselves declared losses and paid no dividends to 
ABG.108 Agreeing with the submission of the revenue authority, the 
Tribunal held that the “transactions were simply a design created by 
the appellant aimed at tax evasion. . . .”109 Though the judgment did 
not provide details of the transactions between ABG and its 
subsidiaries, it could be referring to a common tax planning structure 
where subsidiaries in high tax jurisdictions are structured to 
continuously declare losses while their earnings are stripped out 
 
103 Id. at 19. 
104 Id. at 7. (ABG relied on the provision of § 66 (4) (a) of the Income Tax Act of 
Tanzania, 2004). 
105 Id. at 8. 
106 Id. 
107 See Vanclay, supra note 79, at 21 
108 Id. at 18. 
109 Id. at 20. 
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through management service debts, high interests, technical fees, and 
other earnings stripping measures.110 By focusing on the spirit of the 
law and adopting the purposive approach to rule interpretation, the 
tribunal departed from earlier practices which elevated tax evasion 
over tax avoidance. The tribunal went further to equate both terms, 
blurring further the thin line between them. 
Discussing tax avoidance practices of tax practitioners without 
highlighting the economic consequences and impacts on achieving the 
SDGs presents a narrow image and undermines the connection with 
ethical dilemmas that tax practitioners undergo. Zucman, et. al, argue 
that close to forty percent of multinational profits are shifted to tax 
havens, reducing corporate income tax revenue by more than $200 
billion, or ten percent of global corporate tax receipts. The authors 
claim that in 2017 MNEs shifted more than $700 billion in profits to tax 
havens, reducing global corporate tax receipts by close to ten 
percent.111 These numbers feed into the larger discussion of illicit 
financial flows, particularly, the commercial aspects of illicit financial 
flows. Rex McHenzie argues that the corruption component of illicit 
financial flows accounts for three percent of the global total; the 
criminal component accounts for thirty to thirty-five percent of the 
global total and the commercial component takes up to sixty to sixty-
five percent of the global total.112 The commercial component of IFFs 
includes tax avoidance activities.113 
Highlighting further the extent of tax avoidance, especially 
using the African continent as case study, a 2008 study by Ndikumana 
and Boyce put illicit flows from forty sub-Saharan African countries 
between 1970 and 2004 at USD$420 billion in 2004 dollars.114 The 
 
110 Torslov et al., The Missing Profits of Nations, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., 
Working Paper No. 24701, 2018). 
111 See Vanclay, supra note 79. 
112 See generally Rex. A. McKenzie, The Africa Rising Narrative – Whither 
Development?, Discussion Paper No. 9 (Kingston U. London, School of Econ., June 
2016). 
113 The components of IFFs are commercial and manifested in trade mispricing, 
transfer mispricing, other base erosion and profit shifting activities, such as thin 
capitalization, and tax evasion; criminal component- drugs, arms and human 
trafficking, oil and mineral theft; and the corruption component. 
114 Léonce Ndikumana & James K. Boyce, New Estimates of Capital Flight from Sub-
Saharan African Countries: Linkages with External Borrowing and Policy Options 6 
(U. Mass. Pol. Econ. Rsch. Inst., Working Paper No. 166, April 2008). 
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Mbeki Report puts the yearly value of IFFs out of Africa at USD$50 
billion.115 As a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), sub-
Saharan Africa sustains the biggest loss, with IFFs averaging 5.5 
percent of GDP, in excess of the global average of 3.9 percent.116 
Adopting the claim by the Mbeki Report that Africa loses 
conservatively, US$50 billion per annum to illicit financial flows and 
applying the lower rate of sixty percent stated by McKenzie,117 to the 
US$50 billion, US$30 billion is lost to the commercial component of 
illicit financial flows. If twenty percent of the US$30 billion is as a result 
of tax avoidance practices by companies, which is a conservative 
estimate, US$6 billion would be lost yearly out of Africa as a result of 
transfer mispricing. 
Focusing the conversation on a country, Nigeria accounts for a 
large percentage of the IFFs out of sub-Saharan Africa.118 For example, 
Global Financial Integrity (GFI) in 2010 reported that illicit financial 
flows out of Nigeria were: USD$6.3 billion in 2000; USD$5.4 billion in 
2001; USD$5.1 billion in 2002; USD$9.7 billion in 2003; USD$15 billion 
in 2004; USD$18.7 billion in 2005; USD$23 billion in 2006; USD$34.7 
billion in 2007; and USD$51.7 billion in 2008.119 At the 2008 estimate of 
USD$51.7 billion, transfer mispricing out of Nigeria may amount to 
more than USD$6 billion a year. This is significant for a country whose 
total yearly budget is under USD$30 billion. Where twenty percent of 
potential tax revenue is lost to tax avoidance activities implemented 
by tax practitioners, it becomes obvious why meeting the SDGs is 
difficult for some countries, notwithstanding their efforts. 
 
115 UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA, ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWS: 
REPORT OF THE HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWS FROM AFRICA 
(2015),https://repository.uneca.org/bitstream/handle/10855/22695/b11524868.pdf?
sequence=3&isAllowed=y. 
116 Dev Kar & Joseph Spanjers, Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries 
2003-2012, 46 (2014). 
117 McKenzie, supra note 112, at 11 
118 Ndikumana & Boyce, supra note 114; Léonce Ndikumana & James K. Boyce, 
Public Debts and Private Assets: Explaining Capital Flight from Sub-Saharan African 
Countries, 114 (2003). 
119 Dev Kar & Devon Cartwright-Smith, Illicit Financial Flows from Africa: Hidden 
Resource for Development 40 (2010). 
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5.1.2. Ethical Considerations for Tax Practitioners 
As tax practitioners go about offering advisory services, ethics 
play a key role in determining how companies report their tax 
liabilities. The ethical underpinnings of tax practitioners influence tax 
morale and it is important that this connection is made. Two ethical 
principles are of particular relevance to the activities of tax 
practitioners. These are: deontology and virtue ethics. 
5.1.2.1. Deontology 
Deontology denotes a rule-based ethical consideration. This 
ethical principle pays less attention to the consequences of one’s 
actions120 and elevates one’s adherence or application to a set of rules. 
Thus, a deontologist will be justified to act immorally if the action is 
backed by rules. For tax practitioners, this provides justification for 
carrying out the instructions of their clients, even if those instructions 
are immoral and result in grave consequences, where they can justify 
compliance with a set of rules. 
For instance, the Statement of Taxation Standard (STS) issued 
by the Chartered Institute of Taxation of Nigeria (CITN) provides that 
when acting for a client, a tax practitioner places his professional 
expertise at the disposal of that client and in so doing the member 
assumes a duty of care towards the client.121 The STS further provides 
that, in addition to the duty owed to the client, the tax practitioner 
owes a duty to the tax system. However, it swiftly counters the duty 
owed to the tax system by providing that is well established that the 
taxpayer has no obligation to pay more tax than legally owed and a tax 
practitioner has a duty to assist in achieving that result,122 reinforcing 
the Westminster Doctrine. Thus, deontology will justify tax avoidance 
activities implemented by tax practitioners on behalf of clients, given 
 
120 See Pe Bryne, Consequentialist Moral Theory”, in The Philosophical and 
Theological Foundations of Ethics, (Palgrave Macmillan 1999); see also Paul J. 
Zwier, The Consequentialist/Nonconsequentialist Ethical Distinction: A Tool for the 
Formal Appraisal of Traditional Negligence and Economic Tort Analysis, 26 B.C.L. 
Rev. 905, 909 (1985). 
121 Statement of Taxation Standard (STS 1-8), pursuant to the Chartered Institute of 
Taxation of Nigeria Act (2013), Cap. (C10) (Nigeria). 
122 Id. at C12. 
2021 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN HRIAS 301 
that your primarily and utmost duty is to the client. While this will 
appear acceptable to a deontologist, it goes against other ethical 
principles such as consequentialism and utilitarianism. 
Having said that, recent policies by governments of some 
countries in light of the coronavirus pandemic may question such a 
narrow view of the scope of the duty to client primacy by tax 
practitioners. Countries in the European Union—Poland, Denmark, 
etc.— and others outside the EU decided against giving bailout funds 
to companies registered in tax havens.123 Considering that one tool of 
eroding tax bases and shifting profits out of countries where they are 
due is to incorporate the otherwise tax-liable entity in a tax haven, one 
would be right to question if it is not in the best interest of the client 
for tax practitioners to place the duty to the tax system ahead of the 
duty to the client. This is further relevant given that most tax laws have 
a general anti-avoidance provision, which covers artificial transactions 
and incorporating entities in tax havens to take advantage of loopholes 
in the tax laws; as such, making such practices unlawful. 
On the other hand, will taxpayers who are unable to benefit 
from the bailouts be justified to sue their tax advisers whose advice 
encouraged them to incorporate entities in tax havens and has now led 
to disqualification from bailouts? Could the tax practitioners be liable 
for damages for the breach of contract, professionalism, and 
negligence, where their advisory services have resulted in the 
bankruptcy of their clients and eventual winding up? This potential 
for liability could influence the future acts of tax practitioners when 
advising clients. Probably, what is needed going forward is a broader 
perspective on the primacy of the duty to the client. 
5.1.2.2 Virtue Ethics 
Beyond the regard for rules or the concern for consequences of 
one’s acts, an important ethical consideration is the moral character of 
 
123 Jo Harper, EU Split over Halting Bailouts for Tax Haven Firms, DW (Apr. 4,2020) 
https://www.dw.com/en/eu-split-over-halting-bailouts-for-tax-haven-firms/a-
53278756; Scotland Joins Wave of Countries Blocking Tax Haven-tied Corporations 
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the individual and its constitution.124 At the center of the 
determination of the justification of the acts of the tax practitioner is 
the good character or otherwise of the tax practitioner.125 However, 
this good character is not natural to man, but a product of nurture. 
Where one is not born virtuous and virtue must be acquired 
through developing the right habits, then it is arguable that both the 
socio-economic environment and the legal system play important roles 
in forming a virtuous person. Appreciating the motivation of good 
character provides a better understanding of the acts of tax practitioner 
as they advise taxpayers. 
West, examining MacIntyre’s contemporary virtue ethics, 
makes the connection between tax avoidance and Donald Cressey’s 
‘fraud triangle’.126 The fraud triangle, per West, stipulates three factors 
that must cumulatively be present to influence the character of one: 
perceived opportunity, perceived pressure, and rationale. 
Opportunity refers to encouraging circumstances to act in a certain 
way, for instance, access to accounting records, knowledge that the tax 
authority lacks the technical capacity to adequately audit the accounts 
of companies as observed in the Mopani’s case where parties to a 
dispute had to seek the opinion of Messrs Deloitte and Touche on 
whether the transactions between a subsidiary and the parent 
company were at arm’s length (discussed below). Pressure refers to 
external forces influencing one’s need and can be pecuniary or driven 
by firm competition. Rationale implies the intellectual justification for 
acting by the tax practitioner, which could be that the act is legal, 
protects private property, or is an acceptable global standard. In the 
absence of contravening influences, it becomes justifiable to develop 
unethical habits which are defensible. And in a world filled with 
controversies of what is wrong or right, defining with certainty, what 
virtue is in tax practice becomes a difficult task. A question that 
remains is what role can law play in establishing virtue ethics in tax 
practice? 
 
124 Lars Lofquist, Virtue Ethics and Disasters in DISASTERS: CORE CONCEPTS 
AND ETHICAL THEORIES, ADVANCING GLOBAL BIOETHICS 203, 203-04 
(O’ Mathuna D., Dranseika V Gordijn ed.,2018). 
125 See Joseph Grcic, Virtue Theory, Relativism and Survival, 3 INT’L J. SOC. SCI. & 
HUMANITY 416 (2013). 
126 Andrew West, Multinational Tax Avoidance: Virtue Ethics and the Role of 
Accountants, 153 J. BUS. ETHICS 1143 (2018). 
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Law plays a key role in shaping the habits of all, and in this 
context, tax practitioners. However, legislative enactments on taxes 
have not been helpful in forming the virtuous character for tax 
practitioners. This, as a result of the ambiguous nature of tax laws, 
leaves room for ambiguity of which tax practitioners take advantage. 
In recent times, the courts have been relied upon to help mold the 
character of tax practitioners, through judicial decisions with far-
reaching implications for tax practice and tax practitioners. A case of 
importance is that of Mopani Copper Mines Plc v. Zambia Revenue 
Authority.127 
In May 2020, the Supreme Court of Zambia, in upholding the 
decision of the Tax Appeal Tribunal, held that Mopani Copper Mine 
had engaged in abusive transfer pricing with its parent company, 
Glencore International AG (GIA) and fined Mopani Copper Mine the 
sum of US$13 million for engaging in abusive transfer pricing. This 
abusive transfer pricing, Mopani achieved by colluding with its parent 
company, GIA, to undervalue the price of copper sold to the parent 
company, thereby breaching the arm’s length standard expected of 
transactions between related entities. The Supreme Court of Zambia 
described the appeal before it as “archetypical of the problem posed to 
the fiscus of many developing economies by multinational 
corporations engaged in the extractive industry.”128 Identifying the 
absence of technical capacity among revenue authorities, which 
provides opportunities for tax practitioners to take advantage of gaps 
in tax laws for the benefits of their clients, the Supreme Court of 
Zambia rejected the argument by the appellant that a report by a firm 
of tax practitioners should be binding on the revenue authority. The 
court ruled that, “it would be incongruous for a tax authority such as 
the respondent to be content with an audit report requested for by a 
party so closely related to the taxpayer in a relationship which 
naturally arouses suspicion.”129 
The decision in Mopani gives further support to the judgment 
in the Tanzanian case of African Barrick Gold, where the court ruled 
that tax avoidance practices, which may have been considered legal in 
the past, would now be deemed to be tax evasion, and as such 
considered illegal. The implications of these cases for tax practice are 
 
127 Mopani Copper Mines Plc v. Zambia Revenue Authority (2020) ZLR J1. 
128 Id. at J2. 
129 Id.at J53. 
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worth mentioning briefly. First, is the court’s impatience for the 
cosmetic distinction between tax avoidance and tax evasion, but clear 
conclusion that base erosion and profit shifting schemes designed by 
tax practitioners for the benefit of their clients, are against the law and 
as such, are illegal with attendant consequences for the taxpayers. This 
poses a clear departure from the Duke of Westminster doctrine. 
Second, is the court’s conclusion that activities of tax practitioners for 
their clients should be treated with suspicion, thereby, implying that 
the burden of proof in tax matters should be on the tax practitioner. 
Third, is the growing judicial activism by courts in African countries, 
and other developing countries, which seeks to fill in the gap left by 
ambiguous legislative enactments. This judicial activism may be key 
to achieving sustainable development by many countries far off the 
mark and facing individual and corporate captures, in addition to 
weak laws. 
Therefore, while a tax practitioner may find rationale to engage 
in tax avoidance activities and firm pressure may provide extra 
motivation, law can serve to limit the opportunities for such activities, 
thereby molding the good character of the virtue ethics proponent. In 
the absence of legislative direction, judicial decisions may rise to fill in 
the gap. 
6. CONCLUSION 
The absence of ethical rules and regulation for all those 
involved in human rights impact assessments is detrimental to the 
process itself and effectively undermines it. It is clear that the human 
rights audit industry may wish to avoid any professionalization, or 
adding extra layers of professional regulation, because of its fear of 
losing control,130 as well as because ethical regulation entails a higher 
degree of cost. However, these are hardly sufficient reasons for the 
absence of even the slightest ethical regulation and guidance for the 
emerging profession of human rights auditing. The conflation of an 
 
130 If human rights auditors became a liberal profession subject to particular standards 
and regulation, it would have to be subject to a self-regulated regulatory body, which 
would have to be independent from the audit firms that employ its members. In the 
process, audit firms would not be able to control the qualifications, fees and ethical 
limitations of auditors and in addition the latter would perhaps find it expedient to 
form trade unions as a means of promoting their interests against audit firms. 
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audit’s terms of reference with ethics is no doubt not only the result of 
misunderstanding of the role of ethics in the process, but also a 
deliberate act that allows audit firms to provide a service to a client 
rather than operate in the public interest. 
This is one of the major problems with HRIAs. The assessment 
of human rights risks was not meant to be profits-driven, or a tool to 
weed out risks to the corporation; on the contrary, it was and still is 
meant to be rights-oriented and hence serve a public purpose.131 The 
absence of ethical guidelines renders auditors complicit in what might 
ultimately turn out to be a ‘soft’ box ticking exercise. Where an audit 
is predicated on a contractual relationship and which is in the interest 
of the audit firm to be long-term, the objectivity of the audit is 
questionable where the auditors are not independent from the audit 
firm. Put another way, it would be unthinkable for the state to employ 
each and every lawyer on its territory yet ask them to represent 
accused persons fairly but without confidentiality, professional 
privileges, or acting in their best interest. Yet, this is exactly the context 
in which human rights auditors perform their duties. We are not 
suggesting that there is no place for self-regulation in corporate 
accountability or human rights auditing; quite the contrary. Rather, 
sensible and best practices from other professions are imperative if 
human rights outcomes are to be taken seriously and the aim of audits 
is to be aligned with the broader public interest. It is high time that a 
task force is established to set out an appropriate code of ethics, as well 
as a regulatory entity that monitors adherence to the code for all 
human rights auditors. 
Tax practitioners, on the other hand, faced with conflicting 
rules and absence of legislative clarity, must assume greater 
responsibility. This means that it is no longer sufficient to hide under 
the cover of legality, but they must consciously seek to comply with 
the spirit of law and particularly in light of the human rights standards 
voluntarily employed by the corporation in its human rights audit. It 
may also be argued that tax practitioners may have to take a utilitarian 
approach to their practice, caring more for the collective good,132 as 
 
131 See Bjorn Fasterling, Human Rights Due Diligence as Risk Management: Social 
Risk Versus Human Rights Risk 2 Bus. & Hum. Rts. J. 225, 228 (2017). 
132 Utilitarianism represents seeking the collective good of a tribe, country or mankind, 
and resisting any threat to the collective good. See JOHN STUART MILL, 
UTILITARIANISM 10-19 (Batoche Books: Kitchener 2001) (1863). It encourages actors 
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opposed to just the strict interests of their client. Finally, if there is any 
lesson we have learned from the financial crisis, and now pandemics, 
is that everyone looks to the government for a bailout. Thus, when tax 
practitioners put their duty to the tax system over that of their clients, 
they are not only contributing to the sustainable development of the 
jurisdictions where they operate, but also protecting the private 
property of their clients. 
 
to act always to promote the greatest good for the greatest number of persons. Id. As 
a form of consequentialism, utilitarianism assesses the acceptability of an act by its 
benefit to the community or a larger population, not by its conformity to rules. See 
Klaus Mathis & Deborah Shannon, Jeremy Bentham’s Utilitarianism, in Efficiency 
Instead of Justice?, in 84 LAW AND PHILOSOPHY LIBRARY 103, 104 (2009). 
